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While European countries have been very generous by opening their frontiers to 
trade, investing in transition countries, and accepting as EU new members some of 
the latter, their migration policies were less liberal. The policy coherence debate is an 
old theme in the international economics literature, which is revisited here by looking 
at the relationships between aid and migration policies towards new member states. 
Are they substitutes or complements? What happens if eastern European labour 
markets conditions improve? In theory, potential migrants will stay home, and the 
concern of being invaded by skilled/unskilled workers searching for better conditions 
and higher wages in the old member states can be alleviated. But in practice, at low 
level or revenue in the origin countries, economic progress can result in lowering a 
budgetary constraint (potential migrants cannot afford the cost of moving), leading to 
more migration pressures. We therefore compute the critical level of GDP, above 
which an increase in European transfers and improvement in economic situation of 
the recipient country will not lead to an increase in migration pressures by decreasing 
the cost of moving. It amounts to 2837 $US for within European migration. We argue 
that this critical level is not the same for a skilled and for an unskilled individual. In 
other words, the critical revenue, under which a skilled individual with better 
opportunities abroad decides to migrate, will be higher than the critical revenue for an 
unskilled worker, who may be better off by staying home and looking for a job at 
home: US$15085 for the former, and US$ 4384 for the latter. This has an important 
implication, namely that in some cases, increasing financial transfers will result in 
increasing the gap between skilled and unskilled departures from countries suffering 
already from a brain drain phenomena. 
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Introduction 
Considerable progress in the re-unification process between Western and Eastern 
Europe has been achieved over the last fifteen years. This progress is the result of 
different factors, trade and financial opening, particularly with the EU, reforms, 
privatisation, and stabilisation. For the countries, which eventually entered the EU, 
the implementation of the European set of rules like democracy, the rule of law, the 
respect of the minorities, and the Acquis Communautaire, has played a key role in 
attracting investors, implementing a strong and reliable business environment, and 
enforcing confidence in the emerging markets. Last but not least, important amounts 
of financial aid have been provided to the countries, which wanted either to join the 
EU or to participate to the creation of a large European area and “high-quality” 
neighbouring. The last chapter of the European reconstruction which followed the fall 
of the Berlin wall has been the complete opening of the borders for individuals. The 
free movement of persons is currently under progress and is likely to constitute the 
very last step in the process of European re-integration.  
Can we think of a sort of rationale behind this apparent non-consistency of the 
European policies towards Eastern European countries, being very liberal in the 
extent of trade and financial opening, generous in terms of the financial/technical 
assistance provided to those countries, but at the same showing some inconsistency 
by closing the EU’s frontiers to the immigration of Eastern Europeans? Relying upon 
the seminal work of Schiff (2006), this paper will try to answer the question. We 
present in section 1 objectives of the study, in section 2 the stylised facts, in section 3 
the data, methodology, and results. In section 4 we extend the analysis of the 
migration/aid relationships by taking into account the skilled versus unskilled nature 
of the migrants coming to Western Europe. Conclusion summarizes.   4
1 Objectives of this study 
The policy coherence debate is an old theme in the international economics literature 
since the seminal work of Mundell (1957). In principle trade and migration are 
substitute, implying that opening trade dampens the migration pressures, but they 
can be complementary
1.  
What about aid and migration policies? Are they substitutes or complements, 
particularly in Europe? “Substitute” means that by improving the conditions on the 
local labour markets (local wages, better perspectives over the long run), the 
incentives for emigrating become lower, and the concern of being invaded by 
skilled/unskilled workers searching for better conditions and higher wages can be 
alleviated. “Complement” means that at low level of revenue and when potential 
migrants cannot afford the cost of moving because of a liquidity constraint, economic 
progress can result in lowering this liquidity constraint, leading to more migration 
pressures. We therefore ask the question whether improving living standard in 
Eastern and Central Europe might result in an increase or decrease of migration 
flows to the industrialized countries.  
To our knowledge very few empirical papers have answered precisely these 
questions, but a recent work by Beuran, Berthelemy and Maurel (2008), which 
analyses the aid/migration relationships by focusing on a broader range of countries. 
The question is particularly relevant from a policy perspective in Europe. “Structural 
Fund” policies have played a key role in the catching-up process in Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain in the European Union, and a similar policy is now implemented 
in favour of new members of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe. Our 
objective is to compute the critical level of GDP, above which an increase in 
European transfers and improvement in economic situation of the recipient country 
will not lead to an increase in migration pressures by decreasing the cost of moving. 
In other words, we want to compute the level of GDP above which aid and migration 
will be consistent with each other.  
                                                 
1 Complementarities may exist between labour flows and trade in particular (Markusen, 1983). Schiff 
(2006) provides a recent survey on recent developments in this literature.   5
Another key issue is the skilled content of migration flows. Recall that if trade and 
migration were substitutes, trade would be specialized and migration should provide 
EU-15 countries with unskilled workers. This does not necessarily occur for two 
reasons. Migration and trade are not always substitute, and the composition 
(skilled/unskilled) of migration does not necessarily follow the logics of specialisation. 
Second migration policies tend to favour skilled migration. As a result, all categories 
of workers have incentives for moving to Western Europe. Whatever his education, a 
potential migrant will take the step if the expected migration’s payoff is positive.  
Our prior is that the threshold, below which the migration’s payoff is positive, may not 
be the same for a skilled and for an unskilled individual. In other words, the critical 
revenue, under which a skilled individual with better opportunities abroad decides to 
migrate, will be higher than the critical revenue for an unskilled worker, who may be 
better off by staying home and looking for a job at home. This has an important 
implication, namely that in some cases, increasing financial transfers will result in 
increasing the gap between skilled and unskilled departures from countries suffering 
already from a brain drain phenomena.  
 
2 The stylised facts: European trade, finance and aid 
2.1 Trade and Finance 
The restructuring of trade and output has been extremely fast in central and eastern 
European countries (CEECs
2). Over the course of 15 years, the whole region has 
succeeded in recovering the GDP level of the pre-transition period, changing the 
pattern of trade into a more mature one, reaching the potential volume predicted by 
empirical models, and more generally being integrated with Western Europe. The 
most striking fact in this regard is the timeline of EU accession. The time from the 
date when negotiations started to the date when the fifth enlargement occurred has 
been extremely short, significantly shorter than those for the previous enlargements 
in 1973, 1986, and 1995 (Duchêne et al., 2004). 
                                                 
2 ‘CEECs’ refers to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, 
Romania and Bulgaria; ‘Central European countries’ refers to Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Hungary; and ‘Eastern European countries’ refer to the six other CEECs. EU15 refers to the 15 countries that 
comprised the EU before the enlargement of May 1
st, 2004.    6
This political agenda has been crucial to the emergence of conditions amenable to 
increase in production, to well-functioning markets indispensable for deepening the 
level of European re-construction, and to duty-free access to a Single Market. 
Between 1991 and 1993, CEECs opened to foreign investments, and between 1991 
and 1996 they signed the Europe Association Agreements that de facto launched the 
accession process, resulting in EU membership for all CEECs in two waves, first in 
2004, then in 2007.  
In order to become eligible for accession to the EU, the CEECs had to remove, albeit 
gradually, their barriers to trade with the EU, introduce trade-facilitating measures, 
and reform their customs administration, as well as make reforms to converge to the 
Acquis Communautaire. In addition to duty-free access to EU markets that went into 
effect for most industrial products, the EU launched a Pan-European cumulation 
project. Its objectives were twofold: harmonization of the pace of duty-removal on 
industrial products and regionalization of the rules of origin through a diagonal 
cumulation system. The European Cumulation Agreement, which went into effect on 
January 1, 1997, linked CEECs (excluding Croatia) and European Economic Area 
countries through a diagonal cumulation system allowing imports in these countries 
to be treated as local inputs. The shift to duty free trade in industrial products was 
accelerated, and a single European trading bloc was fully in place on January 1, 
2002.  
Taken together, these measures have contributed to the emergence of well-
functioning service blocs and a business-friendly environment, both necessary 
conditions for participation in a fragmentation-induced division of labour. As reflected 
by the evolution of the CEECs’ trade, European transition countries rapidly changed 
their specialisation from traditional low value-added sectors, like textiles, clothing, 
and agriculture, to sectors requiring more knowledge, managerial skills, and 
technological competencies, i.e., high value-added sectors (Freudenberg and 
Lemoine, 1999). Moreover, their trading volume, especially with EU15 countries, 
increased dramatically (see Table 1a, Annex 1), suggesting an increasing integration 
of the CEECs into EU15 production networks. This evolution was driven mainly by 
FDI (mostly from the EU15), which were increasingly located in the CEECs (see 
Table 1b, Annex1). For a global assessment of the forces driving the localization of   7
FDI in the region and driving the process of integrating these countries into EU15 
production networks, see Lefilleur and Maurel (2008). 
2.2 European aid policies  
In addition, the transition in CEECs benefited from an exceptional historical 
commitment of the EU, which opened its frontiers dramatically, invested massively, 
and which, after the New Member States (NMS thereafter) entry into the EU, send 
large transfers of funds to the poorest member states. The reason behind this 
historical commitment was that CEECs were perceived very soon as natural 
candidates for applying to EU memberships, although at the same time the 
conditions for entering the EU were quite demanding. The candidate countries of 
Eastern Europe were asked indeed to achieve the conditions for being capable of 
participating in the Single Market and for transforming themselves into liberal 
economies and political democracies (Copenhagen criteria).  
 
Such ambitious conditions called for the implementation of a no less ambitious 
programme of assistance. The ‘Europe Agreements’ were intended to establish 
bilateral free trade in industrial products between the EEC and each of the CEECs, 
and to develop industrial, technical and scientific cooperation. Those Agreements 
paved the way to the eventual accession of the CEECs to the European Union. The 
Copenhagen European Council (21–22 June 1993) confirmed that the countries that 
held associate membership might become full members of the European Union, 
provided that they fulfilled the precise economic and political criteria: ‘stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.’ The European Council drew up a list of the Central European countries that 
might accede to the European Union: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
In addition to the trade and financial agreements, a programme of financial aid was 
implemented. The Phare programme (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the   8
Restructuring of the Economy) was extended in 1990 to all the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEECs). It aimed to support candidate countries in the process 
of adopting and implementing the Community Acquis and in preparing them for the 
management of the Structural Funds. During the period 2000–2006, the Phare 
programme was supplemented by the ISPA programme for the environment and 
transport and the SAPARD programme for agriculture. The commitments and 
payments made under the different European programmes are reported in table 2.  
  
For the period 2007–2013, the European Union has established new external aid 
instruments. Phare and the other pre-accession instruments (ISPA and SAPARD) 
have been replaced by the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance). The 
CARDS neighbourhood programme, which aimed to provide Community assistance 
to the countries of South-Eastern Europe so that they might participate in the process 
of stabilisation and association with the EU, was also absorbed by the IPA. As EU 
candidate countries, Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, along with the potential candidate countries (Western Balkans), benefit 
from the IPA. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 
replaced the Tacis and MEDA neighbourhood instruments in 2007. 
 
Moreover, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was 
established on 15 April 1991. Up to now, this bank is responsible for the granting of 
loans for productive investment in transition countries, which, in turn, were committed 
to applying the principles of multiparty democracy and full-fledged market economy. 
 
Whereas the Phare programme was targeted towards the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Tacis (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States) programme was intended for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). As opposed to the Phare programme, Tacis was a 
neighbourhood instrument, not a pre-accession instrument, which was originally 
intended for the former USSR. The Tacis I programme covered the period 1991–
1999, and was mainly intended for the restructuring of businesses and human 
resources and for ensuring nuclear safety. This programme was re-conducted for the 
period 2000–2006 under a new programme called Tacis II. Tacis II also redefined its 
priorities: nuclear safety and institutional, legal and administrative reform. For the first   9
time, an EU technical assistance programme was used as a conditionality tool 
following the Russian army’s intervention in Chechnya in 1999. 
 
As can be seen from the comparison of tables 2 and 3, the European Aid goes far 
beyond the official development aid (ODA), in financial amounts, topics covered, and 
objectives pursued.  
 




Sector Countries    Disbursements  Commitments 
Phare 1990-
2006 
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Restructuring of the 
Economy 
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Lithuania 
5589 millions 
euros for the 
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euros for the 
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  11,46 billions, 
2006 euro 
prices 
ENPI          
Sources: Europa, http://europa.eu/scadplus/scad_fr.htm 
« Supporting enlargement, what does the evaluation show ?” , 2007, consolidated summary report 
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Table 3 : Official Development Aid Total, Net disbursements, constant prices 2006 USD and euro millions
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
EU Donors (euros)  42  31  62  126 97  137 202 211 121 246 1  277
All Donors (euros)  172 272 517 355 196 276 388 402 329 406 3  313
EU  Donors  (source  data,  US  $)  53  39  77  156 121 170 250 262 150 305 1  584
All  Donors    (source  data,  US  $)  213 338 641 441 243 343 481 498 409 504 4  110
Source: OECD  (DAC), Exchange rate OECD, authors calculus 
 
2.3 Consistency of European policies  
As suggested by the EU policies towards non member European countries, aid can 
be understood as having many components: a trade component, as reflected in the 
European Agreements, capital, financial assistance, and migration. For what regards 
all of them but migration, they were consistent during the transition period, and as a 
consequence, trade, finance, and aid increase simultaneously by significant 
amounts.  
But the policies are not always coherent. Certain situations in the world are 
characterized by inconsistencies, which are collected by the Centre for Global 
Development and its “Commitment to Development Index” (Roodman, 2005, see 
Figure 1 below). For instance, France and Japan, which are among the biggest 
donors of foreign assistance, are also among the countries that implement the 
hardest immigration policies. Nordic countries, which give a lot of financial assistance 
in proportion of their GDP, and are ranked very high by the Centre for Global 
Development for their aid policies, do not perform particularly well with respect to 
immigration policies. By attracting skilled migrants from developing countries, donors 
destroy the capacities that they have contributed to build through their financial 
support. Those examples reflect the non-consistency of foreign policies of OECD 
countries.    11
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Source : Center for Global Development 
 (http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/_non_flash/) 
 
For the European case, the only inconsistency was the migration policy against 
potential workers from EU candidate countries (some of them became members) and 
European neighbours. While the former is deemed to disappear because (or thanks) 
to the recent EU enlargements, the latter will continue to persist by following the 
general pattern.  
Indeed the flows of workers have been quite limited over the period. In 1997, officially 
950 000 individuals from the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) lived 
in the European Union, a number which accounted for only 0.2% of the total EU 
population. This migration, however, was unevenly spread across European Union 
countries: 527 000 (respectively 103 000) citizens of the CEECs lived in Germany (in 
Austria).  
Migration seems to be therefore the less important aspect of the liberalisation 
process which occurred in Europe over the nineties. In Germany and Austria for 
instance, which share common borders with the CEECs and face the bulk of 
migration from Eastern neighbouring countries as suggested by the figures above, 
governments fear that migrants will be attracted by much higher salaries through 
crossing merely the borders. The labour market in EU countries suffering from high   12
unemployment, migration would further exacerbate the problem. One concern is the 
perceived possible invasion of skilled workers ready to accept lower remunerations. 
Other fears are stressed, like the possible abuse of existing welfare systems.  
There are also concerns on the side of NMS, which face extremely high level of 
unemployment. Besides, as reflected in table 4, the demographic conditions are 
worrying, fertility rates being below the 2.1 level needed for the reproduction of the 
population. The dependency ratios are slightly better than in Western Europe, but 
they are expected to deteriorate. Some dramatic increases in emigration occurred in 
the early nineties, but in some cases net emigration is positive. The main fear 
concerns now the exodus of young and skilled nationals.  
Table 4 : Demographic Indicators for 2005 
















(% of total) 
Dependency 
ratio : B/A 
Bulgaria 9,0  1,31  -43078  69,4  16,8  0,44
Czech Republic  10,0  1,28  67016  71,2  14,2  0,40
Estonia 10,7  1,50  910  68,3  16,5  0,46
Hungary 9,6  1,32  65000  69,1  15,2  0,45
Latvia 9,3  1,31  -19584  68,4  16,9  0,46
Lithuania 8,9  1,27  -29755  67,8  15,5  0,47
Poland 9,4  1,24  -200000  70,7  12,9  0,41
Romania 10,2  1,32  -270000  69,8  14,8  0,43
Slovak Republic  10,0  1,25  3000  71,5  11,8  0,40
Slovenia 8,8  1,23  21506  70,5  15,6  0,42
European Monetary 
Union 
10,3 1,50  5035748  66,8  17,7 
0,50
Source : World Bank Development Indicators ; authors calculus 
 
European migration policies have probably been much more the reflection of the 
population fears than of the advice from economic and demographic studies, which 
predicted only a limited amount of immigration in their territories. Most countries in 
the EU-15 decided to implement some transitory restrictions on access to their labour 
markets. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Spain were the countries that opted to set labour limitations to the 
citizens of the NMS; contrarily, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom decided against 
these measures for the initial period. Migration was not allowed during an initial 
period of two years. The restriction could then be extended for three additional years. 
After these first five years, another assessment of the situation is to be undertaken,   13
and only in cases when a serious labour-market disturbance or threat is proven, a 
further restraint of two years will potentially be accepted.  
This implies that, at the latest, restrictions will have to be cut in 2011, and that, from 
relatively conservative in the past, migration policies will have to be extremely liberal 
in a very near future. They will have to be in coherence with all other components of 
the assistance, which has been and is still provided to new EU member countries. 
But for what regards European neighbours which are not EU members, the situation 
is dramatically different, in as the general framework of tight migration policies 
applies.  
3 Data,  Methodology,  Results 
3.1 Data 
Our main data source is a panel of flows of migrants from 187 sending countries, 
which are developing, emerging and transition economies, to 22 OECD member 
countries (the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD), 
over the period 1995-2005. We will consider whether these migrations are influenced 
by economic, geographic, demographic and cultural factors.  We pay particular 
attention to the interaction that may exist between foreign assistance policy and 
migrations.  
For disaggregated migration at each educational level (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary), we take advantage of the World Bank’s recent release of an update to the 
global database of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation 
and Poverty.  This database consists of a 226x226 matrix of origin-destination stocks 
by country (see Parsons et al., 2007, for a complete description of the database). It 
provides, however, only one point observation in time, for the year 2000, which 
restricts the quantitative research that can be performed using it. For a complete 
description of the sources which will be used, and the list of countries, see appendix 
1.    14
3.2 Methodology: Equation of Migration  
Migration and aid: the hump-shaped pattern 
According to the purely economic determinants of migration, migration should 
decrease linearly with the GDP per capita of the origin country. Observed migrations 
fit relatively well this intuition (Massey and al., 1998), except for low levels of GDP 
per capita. The hump-shaped pattern hypothesis, which is recurrent in the empirical 
literature (Faini and Venturini, 1993, Hatton and Williamson, 2002, Adams and Page, 
2003), refers to a positive correlation between GDP per capita and migration for 
relatively low levels of GDP per capita and to a negative correlation only for relatively 
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The hump-shaped pattern of migration
 
Source: our database (see Appendix 1) restricted to Est-West European migration 
The hump-shaped pattern can be related to the existence of migration costs, which 
reduce the possibility of emigration from poorest countries. Migration costs include   15
many elements. Such costs can be reduced by geographical proximity – closer 
countries are generally more open to bi-directional migration –, common language, 
as well as historical ties implying overall knowledge of the destination country's 
habits.  
The migration has been also explained in the literature by other factors. First a 
demographic factor (Hatton and Williamson, 1994): poorest countries are also 
youngest and young adults are more likely to migrate than old adults. Second an 
industrialization factor: rural population is reputed to be more reluctant to international 
migration (according to Hatton and Williamson, 2002, page 11, this effect is weak). 
Faini and Venturini (1993) relate the evolution of migration observed in Europe from 
the 1960s to the 1980s to this migration hump framework; they find a positive 
relationship between migration and development for Greece, Portugal and Turkey, 
but not for the more advanced Spain or Italy. Clark et al. (2002), studying immigration 
to the Unite States between 1971 and 1998, find a negative relationship between 
income and migration from middle-income and high-income countries that reverses 
for low-income countries. Hatton and Williamson (2002) contrast emigration from a 
typical Western European country, East Asian country, South American country, and 
finally African country: only for the latter does a rise in income per capita increase 
migration to the US. Cogneau and Gubert (2005) highlight that Mali and Mexico are 
two countries where most migration comes from regions not classified as among the 
poorest.  
We could assume that aid influences migration indirectly through its impact on 
income, as suggested by Faini and Venturini (1993). However, the literature on aid 
effectiveness in promoting growth would not support such an assumption. This 
literature points rather to the disappointing conclusion that the direct effect of aid on 
growth is not robust at best (a quantitative summary of this literature is provided in a 
meta analysis run by Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2005). We assume instead that by 
augmenting the available revenue of the recipient country, an increase in total aid 
might result in a lower budgetary constraint and more possibility for migration. For the   16
poorest transition countries
3, any increase in income is likely to rise rather than 
decreases migration.  
The gravity model of international migration 
According to Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1989, 1994), migration can be viewed as 
an investment in human capital. Migrants chose the destination, where their expected 
payoff is higher than that of any other alternative, including home wage. Several 
predictions can be done from the investment in human capital approach: emigration 
is higher (lower) the greater the mean income in the host (source) country; it is lower 
the greater the level of migration costs; it is higher the greater the payoff to the 
observed variables in the host country relative to the payoff in the host country.  
Based upon the human capital approach, the gravity model of international migration 
is commonly used for quantifying the potential of migration (Karemera and al. (2000) 
and Rotte and Vogler (1999) for instance). Hönekopp (1999) in a literature survey 
mentioned 10 studies on East-West migration based on gravity estimates. According 
to him estimates of the migration potential in these studies vary between 41 000 and 
680 000 annually. Those figures are not far away from the picture, which emerges 
from the OECD statistics in tables 7a to 7c below.  
Migration depends upon supply or push factors in the sending country, and it 
depends also on demand or pull factors in the receiving country. Push factors are the 
GDP per capita differential, the GDP per capita and the squared GDP per capita of 
the sending country for taking into account the liquidity constraint which can be an 
obstacle to a migration decision. Pull factor is essentially the GDP per capita of the 
host country. To those basic variables we add a trade intensity variable, measured by 
bilateral export from country of emigration to country of immigration, as a ratio of 
GDP of the country of emigration; a positive parameter would imply that labour flows 
and external trade are complements (pull factor), while a negative parameter would 
imply that there are substitutes (push factor).  
We depart therefore from the following system of supply and demand equations:  
                                                 
3 For an interesting application of this assumption to Russia and Russian inter-regional mobility, see 
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Combining supply and demand yield a migrant equation, where  ij R represent several 
factors restraining migrant flows, such as transport costs, linguistic, information and 
psychic cost of moving, historical ties, like being a former colony:  
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Taking log from both side yields the following equation:  
ij ij ij j j ij ij u R X GDPpc GDPpc Diff m + + + + + + = 5 4
2
3 2 1 0 α α α α α α  
Where  ij u stand for the error term;  
ij m  is the log of the migration flows between countries i and j;  
ij Diff  is the difference between GDP per capita of the sending and GDP per capita of 
the receiving country. In principle it has a positive parameter, implying that the higher 
is this difference, the higher will be the incentive of moving. Besides we introduce the 
GDP per capita of the sending country and its squared, to fit the hump-shaped 
pattern mentioned above. In principle, we should put as many variables as wages, 
unemployment rates (even those do reflect imperfectly the employment opportunities 
in developing and transition countries), information about tax and social security 
systems. But this information is not available for a wide range of countries, 
particularly for the developing world.   
ij X   is the log of trade intensity, measured by bilateral export from country of 
emigration to country of immigration, as a ratio of GDP of the country of emigration; a 
positive parameter would imply that labour flows and external trade are 
complements, while a negative parameter would imply that there are substitutes.  
ij R   consists in the following set of variables:    18
Bilateral distance between the sending and the receiving country. This variable is a 
proxy for the costs related to migration: the direct expenditures for paying the 
transport, income losses during the migration, psychological costs due to separation 
from relatives, which can be assumed to be bigger if the distance is high. The latter is 
also a proxy for the distance between two fundamentally different social orders (the 
former communist society and the market, although those differences are vanishing 
very fast over the transition period) and for the uncertainty that those differences 
generate. Potential unemployment, potentially hostile attitudes of the host countries 
towards immigrants, the fact that human capital is not always transferable, all those 
factors together make migration a risky business.  
Dummy variables representing historical ties: a “former colony” dummy equal to 1 
when countries i and j have had in the past a colonial relation and equal to zero 
otherwise; a dummy for common language. We also further test whether some post-
colonial ties are more influential than others (e.g. within the Commonwealth or British 
Empire, labour mobility is easier than between France and former French colonies). 
Those dummies are not active for Central and Eastern Europe however.  
Dummy variables that take account that “western offshoots” have more immigrants 
than the “old” Europe; the strong link between United States and Latin America; and 
the cultural specificity of Japan, which has very restrictive attitudes vis-à-vis 
immigration.   
There is a standard technical problem here, related to the censored nature of the 
dependent variable, which cannot be negative. Estimating such equations with all 
observations would result in potentially large biases. This problem is frequently 
treated by estimating equations on samples restricted to strictly positive variables. 
This permits also to specify equations in logarithmic form, which facilitates 
interpretation of parameters as elasticities. We will adopt this logarithmic specification 
form here. This method may result however in a second bias – known as the 
selection bias –, which results from the fact that the selection of a country as a 
destination of migration may depend on variables that also influence the number of 
migrants. There is no perfect solution to this problem, in absence of variables that 
would explain the selection of a country, but not the number of migrants, that it   19
receives. The most frequent approach is to assume that the selection bias is of 
second order, and we will adopt this approach.  
3.3 Results: migration and aid, complement or substitute?  
In Table 5 we present the results for the migration equation. The coefficients have the 
expected signs: positive for the difference in GDP per capita, suggesting that richer 
countries attract more migrants and that migration is determined by the income 
differential, positive for the sending country GDP per capita and negative for its 
squared GDP per capita. We interpret those latter results as confirming the hump-
shaped pattern of migration. For low level of revenue, an increase in GDP per capita 
results in more migration instead of less.  
Table 5 : Migration equation, over 1995-2005 
                                                                                
Coefficient Standard  Error Z-Stat   
diff 1,450***  0,078  18,660  0,000 
lgdppc_s 2,946***  0,271  10,860  0,000 
lgdppc_s2 -0,086***  0,016  -5,230  0,000 
tradeinten~n 1,129** 0,587  1,920  0,055 
ldist -0,576***  0,053  -10,830  0,000 
colbritish 1,138***  0,303  3,760  0,000 
colfrance 1,853***  0,499  3,710  0,000 
colportugal 2,231***  0,826  2,700  0,007 
colspain 1,978***  0,445  4,450  0,000 
comlang 0,768***  0,151  5,070  0,000 
offshoot 2,295***  0,194  11,850  0,000 
time1 -0,031  0,037  -0,840  0,399 
time2 -0,010  0,036  -0,270  0,787 
time3 -0,034  0,035  -0,970  0,330 
time4 -0,441***  0,030  -14,890  0,000 
time5 -0,230***  0,028  -8,190  0,000 
time6 -0,028  0,025  -1,120  0,263 
time7 0,078***  0,025  3,130  0,002 
time8 0,095***  0,026  3,680  0,000 
time9 -0,018  0,025  -0,730  0,467 
Intercept -17,706***  1,342  -13,200  0,000 
Number of observations : 7453, number of pair countries : 1116 
R2 : 0.3282 
Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
As expected, migration is a decreasing function of the physical distance. Sharing a 
common language or a common colonial past with the host country has a positive 
influence on migration flows. Trade intensity as measured by the ratio of export of the 
origin country on its GDP is significant and positive, suggesting that migration and 
trade are more complement than substitute. However, the level of significance of this   20
latter variable is not very high and it should be considered only as a moderately 
significant determinant of migration flows. Time dummies are introduced here only for 
the sake of taking into account a possible trend in migration flows. Parameters 
attached to these time dummies are significant, at least partially, but do not exhibit 
any clear dynamic pattern.  
The presence of the squared GDP per capita of the sending country allows taking 
into account that citizens in the poorest countries do not migrate to the industrialized 
world as much as a simple theory of push and pull determinants would imply. We find 
the inverted-U shape relationship between living standards in the third world and 
migration, as expected. Using the coefficients in table 5 above, we find that migration 
increases with incomes up to a critical revenue value equal to US$ 6084.   
This threshold is higher that the threshold reported in Adams and Page (US$ 1630 in 
1995 prices) or US$ 7400 in PPP prices reported in Beuran, Berthélémy and Maurel 
(2008). 
Of course, at the policymaking level, a case-by-case discussion will be necessary. 
Emigration from relatively poor countries such as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, or Moldova may be positively influenced by taking initial steps toward 
development of their economies. Such migrations are, however, dampened by the 
distance of these countries from Western Europe. Conversely, emigration from 
relatively rich countries may be slowed by further development of their economies. 
This is particularly the case for all twelve new members of the European Union, 
whose GDP per capita is close to US$6084.  According to table 6, only one country, 
Slovenia, which is the richest amongst transition European countries, would face a 
decrease in migration outflows in the case of an increase in its revenue (whatever the 
cause behind this increase, be it aid or not). For all other transition countries 
considered here, economic progresses leading to higher income would conversely 
induce more emigration.  This result may however depend on the specification of our 
equations. Further results below suggest a much smaller threshold. 
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     Table 6: European countries, GDP per capita, constant 2000 US$ prices, WDI 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hungary  3549 3742 3954 3975 3775 3963 3677 3842 3982 4328 4633 4890 5045
  Poland  3411 3621 3875 4066 4251 4455 4537 4605 4787 5045 5230 5562 5935
 Slovak 
Republic  3174 3423 3613 3741 3749 3781 3910 4071 4240 4467 4733 5201 5734
 Slovenia  7975  8258 8686 9013 9480 9855 10145 10505  10792 11264 11710 12341 13016
 Czech 
Republic  5100 5314 5281 5245 5322 5521 5684 5805 6013 6285 6676 7056 7408
  Lithuania  2561 2701 2910 3144 3112 3263 3498 3753 4158 4487 4873 5278 5772
  Estonia  2986 3164 3555 3750 3790 4106 4438 4813 5181 5628 6213 6921 7424
  Latvia  2364 2477 2727 2904 3065 3302 3588 3854 4154 4539 5047 5695 6315










  Cyprus  11870 11899 12007 12458 12916 13425 13811 13926 13947 14198 14408 14705 15071














  Romania  1742 1817 1711 1632 1616 1651 1770 1888 1992 2165 2259 2438 2594
  Turkey  3549 3742 3954 3975 3775 3963 3677 3842 3982 4328 4633 4890 5045
 Macedonia, 





















  Croatia  3337 3675 3857 4015 3937 4092 4333 4573 4818 5023 5238 5490 5798
 Albania  897  988 893 1011 1115 1197 1279 1310  1377 1450 1520 1587 1677
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 480  874 1150 1302 1398 1445 1502 1574  1629 1720 1779 1904 2037































 Serbia  ..    ..    ..    ..    1137 1193 1252 1306  1342 1458 1554 1649 1764
 
 Low & middle 
income  1034 1072 1112 1124 1143 1187 1207 1235 1285 1363 1438 1529 1628
   Low income  310  318 322 325 329 334 339 342  352 368 383 398 415
 
 Lower middle 
income  701 742 774 792 824 863 901 947  1007 1078 1156 1252 1359
 
 Russian 
Federation  1618 1564 1591 1511 1614 1775 1870 1968 2122 2286 2444 2637 2868
    Moldova  331 316 325 307 300 311 334 365 395 430 468 496 516
    Ukraine  672 610 597 591 594 636 701 745 823 930 962 1039 1125  22
But migrations within Europe may differ from migrations from developing to 
developed countries for several historical reasons. Until WWI, Europe had a 
geopolitical structure very different from what it became in the 20th century. The 
Austro-Hungarian Empire has been dismantled. Central and Eastern Europe had 
been separated from Western Europe during the cold war, and the end of the cold 
war has in turn created new waves of migrations from East to West. Migrations within 
Europe have been also revitalized in the past 15 years as the European Union 
continues to expand its membership. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia and its 
dismantlement has spurred emigration from South-eastern Europe.  
 
Three models of within European migration are usually distinguished indeed. The 
Nordic model was introduced as early as 1954 and granted free mobility of labour 
within Scandinavia. The EFTA model promoted the liberalization of trade flows, but 
not factor flows; some EFTA countries, in particular Switzerland and Austria, allowed 
a large inflow of labour from abroad, but limited the social integration of the foreign 
work force by not allowing equal access to the labour market, to social assistance 
and housing and to political participation. The third and last European Community 
model followed yet another model of integration. While free trade was on the agenda 
from the very beginning, free mobility of labour between the 6 founding countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) was allowed 
only when the common market was launched in 1992.   
 
In this general framework traditional migration linkages and history matter, e.g. the 
colonial past in the case of Netherlands, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and 
Portugal. Countries like Germany, Finland, and Greece give preferential treatment to 
returning migrants, who are descendants of former emigrants (Aussiedler in 
Germany, Ingrians in Finland, Pontean Greeks in Greece). For instance during the 
1980ies, 300 000 Poles were given the authorization to emigrate, and amongst them, 
60% came into Germany, with the status of Aussiedler (in other words they sought 
recognition of their ethnic origin in Germany). Other migrants from CEECs were 
belonging to ethnic minorities; for instance, 300 000 Bulgarian of Turkish origin left 
their country for joining Turkey. Romanian, who constitute the second largest migrant 
pool, emigrated mostly during the eighties towards Germany, the US, Hungary, 
Israel, Canada, Australia and France. It is worth noticing that Switzerland has a long   23
standing tradition of taking refugees and asylum seekers, i.e., migration on 
humanitarian grounds. Germany and Austria adopted the Swiss guestworker model 
of migration after WWII, intended to satisfy what were perceived to be short-term 
labour needs. This model may explain partially the fact that they became the main 
destination countries of immigration of East European migrants, as reflected in the 
following tables, which report migration statistics for the three main origin Eastern 
European countries, namely Poland, Romania and Turkey:    24 
Table 7a: inflows of foreign population by nationality 
Poland 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany        87,238 77,405 71,214 66,106  72,21 74,144  79,65 81,551 88,241 
United 
States 
      13,824 15,766 12,035  8,451  8,773  10,09 11,769 12,711  10,51 
Canada        2,312 2,062 1,708 1,446 1,299 1,334 1,168 1,117 1,079 
Netherlands        .. 1,385 1,397 1,464 0,891 1,316 1,437 1,593  1,53 
Belgium        0,8 0,946 1,063 1,118 1,151 1,134 2,928 2,427 2,086 
France        0,869 0,728 0,826 1,404 0,885 0,907 1,039 1,222 1,239 
Australia        0,746 0,708 0,616 0,388 0,372 0,332  0,4 0,341 0,403 
Sweden         0,909 0,682 0,601 0,613 0,673 0,649 0,809 1,065 1,017 
Denmark        0,279  0,37 0,336 0,424 0,352 0,327 0,383 0,419 0,414 
Norway        0,237 0,226 0,243 0,231  0,26  0,24  0,44 0,661 0,564 
Hungary        0,307 0,221 0,199 0,152 0,062 0,075 0,076 0,095 0,069 
Czech 
Republic 
      0,211 0,178 0,133 0,113 0,117 0,089 0,436 1,656  1,58 
United 
Kingdom 
      .. 1 ..  0,053 0  0,471  1,945 .. .. 
Spain        ..  ..  .. 0,436  0,82 3,834 3,672 3,875 3,456 
Slovak 
Republic 
      .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  0,139 
Italy        ..  ..  .. 3,852 6,655 7,055 8,742  15,254  .. 
Greece        .. .. ..  1,344 .. .. .. .. .. 
Austria        ..  ..  .. 4,951  5,12 3,499 3,511 2,454 2,899 
data extracted on 2008/10/06 14:44 from OECD.Stat 
   25 
Table 7b 
Romania 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany        24,814 17,069 14,247 16,987 18,814 24,191 20,328 23,953  23,78 
United 
States 
      4,871 5,799 5,545 5,104 5,678 6,863 6,628 4,887 3,655 
Hungary        5,101 4,161 3,979 5,504 7,845 8,894  10,648  10,307 9,599 
Canada        3,851  3,67 3,916 2,976 3,468 4,431 5,589 5,688 5,466 
France        0,617 0,527 0,641 0,877 0,919  1,16 1,445 1,505 1,566 
Belgium        0,332 0,324 0,384  .. 0,587  0,65 0,966 0,994 0,998 
Sweden        0,33  0,28 0,224 0,286 0,246  0,28 0,287 0,363 0,329 
Czech 
Republic 
      0,118  0,23 0,203 0,184 0,099 0,044  0,23 0,342  0,36 
Norway        0,102 0,115 0,123 0,153 0,123 0,107  0,18 0,203  0,19 
United 
Kingdom 
      .. .. ..  0,042  1,23 0  0,284 .. .. 
Spain        ..  ..  .. 0,502 1,782  17,456  23,295 48,33  54,998 
Slovak 
Republic 
      .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  0,04 
Portugal        .. .. .. .. .. ..  7,847  3,248  0,933 
Poland        ..  ..  .. 0,017 0,073 0,084 0,152 0,169 0,181 
Netherlands        .. .. .. .. ..  0,579  0,659  0,583  0,657 
Italy        ..  ..  ..  5,875 20,885 20,684 18,738 50,168  .. 
Greece        .. .. ..  2,05 .. .. .. .. .. 
Denmark        ..  ..  .. 0,121 0,161 0,164 0,196 0,194 0,173 
Austria        ..  ..  .. 1,528 1,834 1,876 2,357 4,158 5,132 
data extracted on 2008/10/06 14:44 from OECD.Stat 
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Table 7c 
Turkey 
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany        73,592 73,224 55,981 47,958 47,097 49,114 54,587 58,128 49,774 42,644 
Netherlands        4,757 6,399 6,522  5,12 4,215 4,517 4,804 5,434 6,193 4,088 
France        3,642 3,426 5,072 6,782 5,753 6,613 6,884 8,509 8,605 9,047 
United 
States 
      2,947 3,657 3,138 2,676 2,215 2,606 3,215 3,375 3,029 3,835 
Switzerland        3,818 3,368 2,934 2,606 2,964 2,799  3,1  3,2  2,7  2,4 
United 
Kingdom 
      4 1 2  0,824  1,577  1,476  3,564 .. .. .. 
Belgium        2,52 2,491 1,436 2,447 2,216 2,812 2,982 3,872 3,828 3,234 
Denmark        0,838 1,238 0,951 1,154 1,062 0,936 0,926 0,757 0,396 0,393 
Sweden        1,112  1,05 0,842 0,794 0,779 0,696 0,734 0,839 1,183 1,133 
Canada        0,747 0,631 0,662 0,803 0,832 1,097 1,224 1,356 1,444 1,796 
Norway        0,277  0,32  0,35 0,461 0,471 0,356 0,408 0,584 0,468 0,483 
Finland        0,148 0,149 0,187 0,135 0,131  0,14 0,243 0,269 0,271 0,249 
Hungary        0,126 0,136 0,122 0,097 0,093 0,092 0,082 0,117 0,119 0,151 
Spain        .. .. ..  0,048  0,045  0,125  0,105 .. .. .. 
Slovak 
Republic 
      .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  0,037  0,08 
Poland        ..  ..  ..  0,04 0,195 0,208 0,299 0,612 0,573 0,524 
Italy        .. .. ..  1,814  0,962  2,353 .. .. ..  1,125 
Greece        .. .. ..  0,796 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Austria        ..  ..  .. 5,857 7,208 7,019 7,667 10,36 9,687 7,811 
data extracted on 2008/10/06 14:57 from OECD.Stat 
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Also the current context of labour mobility within the enlarged RU is to a large extent 
very different from relations between developed and developing countries. The EU 
has developed an ambitious policy of integration of its former Eastern neighbours. 
Hence migrations take place in an institutional set-up in which the ultimate goal is to 
facilitate the freedom of movements, including of labour, with New Member countries, 
while very often the policy vis-à-vis non-member countries is much more restrictive.  
 
Despite this favourable context, the freedom of labour has been neglected during the 
European enlargement. If the freedom of labour became unavoidable once the 
CEECs entered the EU, during the pre accession period the movements of workers 
were regulated mostly by bilateral agreements, such as the agreement between 
Poland and Germany or between Austria and both Hungary and the Slovak Republic. 
Such bilateral agreements have provided an important framework for the temporary 
movement of workers from the CEECs, and they have brought advantages to both 
employers in the EU, and to the workers themselves; they have also had a positive 
effect in channelling irregular migration into legal seasonal work
4. But they reflected 
also the willingness of the EU countries not to open too dramatically their labour 
markets when the increasing unemployment in North Western Europe would have 
rendered a too liberal policy particularly unpopular:  
The bilateral agreements were worded in very loose terms and were not transposed 
into national law. For example, the German provision which regulates the work of 
seasonal workers and their status in Germany does not set out any specific rights or 
non-discrimination provisions;  
As the agreements with the European Union were intended to supersede the bilateral 
agreements little or no effort was subsequently put into those bilateral agreements;  
The quotas of nationals from the CEECs benefiting from agreements on training are 
not filled, principally because of the demanding criteria (for example, the requirement 
for proficiency in the language of the receiving state as against the low wages on 
offer);  
                                                 
4 Indeed the great majority of workers who benefit from bilateral employment agreements with Member 
States of the European Union are seasonal workers employed in Germany. In respect of Poland for 
example, their number is approximately eight times greater than the sum of all other categories for all 
four countries with which bilateral agreements have been signed.   28
The agreements have been a source of abuse by employers in some countries 
seeking to avoid the costs of employment. 
  
We are now testing aggregated behaviours or potential migrants, and discussing 
whether European migrants behave the same as non-European migrants makes 
sense, notably when we discuss such effects as effects of incomes at home and of 
income differentials. We have tested the existence of specific behaviours of migration 
within Europe by introducing a dummy variable equal to 1 when the country of origin 
is in Central and Eastern Europe (including Cyprus and Malta, which have been 
included in the process of expansion of the European Union) and the country of 
destination is a Western EU member. A Wald test performed shows that the 
interaction of this vector of parameters with the European dummy variable is 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level.  
 
Further scrutiny of results obtained for each variable which we interacted with the 
European dummy variable suggests that all of them are quite significant: the 
difference in GDP per capita, the GDP per capita of the East-European sending 
country and its squared, the distance, the language, the trade intensity variable. 
Results are reported in Table 8 below.  
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Table 8: Migration equation, European specificities 
 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Z-Stat   
diff 1,546***  0,082  18,900  0,000 
diff_eur -0,710***  0,179  -3,970  0,000 
lgdppc_s 2,767***  0,276  10,010  0,000 
lgdppc_seur 0,999***  0,367  2,720  0,006 
lgdppc_s2 -0,068***  0,017  -4,010  0,000 
lgdppc_seur2 -0,116*** 0,031  -3,710  0,000 
tradeinten~n 0,709  0,600  1,180  0,238 
tradeinten~r 9,628***  2,710  3,550  0,000 
ldist -0,616***  0,068  -9,050  0,000 
ldist_eur 0,383***  0,112  3,430  0,001 
colbritish 1,232***  0,301  4,090  0,000 
colfrance 1,955***  0,496  3,940  0,000 
colportugal 2,386***  0,818  2,920  0,004 
colspain 2,167***  0,442  4,910  0,000 
comlang 0,723***  0,154  4,690  0,000 
comlang_eur -1,686**  0,829  -2,030  0,042 
offchoot 2,281***  0,192  11,860  0,000 
time1 -0,033  0,037  -0,870  0,386 
time2 -0,010  0,036  -0,270  0,791 
time3 -0,034  0,035  -0,970  0,331 
time4 -0,442***  0,030  -14,790  0,000 
time5 -0,232***  0,028  -8,210  0,000 
time6 -0,032  0,025  -1,250  0,212 
time7 0,076***  0,025  3,010  0,003 
time8 0,095***  0,026  3,660  0,000 
time9 -0,017  0,025  -0,670  0,502 
intercept -17,355***  1,375  -12,620  0,000 
Number of observations : 7453, number of pair countries : 1116 
R2 : 0.3282 
Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
    
                                                                             
 
Migrants from Eastern Europe are less reactive to revenue differential, but the hump-
shape effect is also different: its weight is higher and, more important, the threshold 
income for which the own income effect starts declining is lower.
5  The end result of 
these two shifts, according to our computations, is that the threshold income under which 
migration and revenue are complement falls to 2837 $US. According to table 6, this 
implies that for most East-European countries, which entered the EU already, migration 
and revenue have not been or are no more complement: Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
republic, do not face and did not create migration pressures induced by their economic 
progress. Hence, if at that time EU members wanted to avoid migration pressures from 
the East there was a win-win situation: as long as income progressed in Eastern 
                                                 
5 This threshold is easy to compute as the half of the ratio of the parameter of GDP per capita to the 
parameter of the squared GDP per capita.   30
neighbours, this reduced the risk of emigration from these countries. By contrast, 
Bulgaria and Romania, which entered the EU only in 2007, all countries classified as 
potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and 
Serbia), and, amongst candidate countries, Macedonia, would experience higher 
emigration outflows in case of an increase in their GDP per capita. Hence, for this 
second group of countries, we may understand why their accession has been delayed: 
as long as such countries are on the left hand side of the hump shape, opening EU 
frontiers to such countries would lead to more migration pressures at least for a while 
and could create policy reversals and inconsistencies of EU transfers and labour market 
liberalization policies. 
 
Distance is less of an impediment to migrating decision of Eastern European migrants 
than of other migrants. Speaking the same language does not significantly influence 
European migration, simply because there are few instances of common languages. Our 
result may be blurred by the fact that within Europe there are some similarities among 
different languages (e.g. Romanian is close to Italian). Also there are some minorities in 
Eastern Europe who spoke already the same language as a neighbour Western country 
(e.g. German). There are significant cultural and historical proximities within Europe, 
explaining perhaps easy migrations in spite of different languages.  
 
The trade intensity coefficient is much higher, with a positive estimated parameter, 
implying that labour flows and external trade are more complements than in North-South 
relations. Referring to Markusen, such complementarity is associated with technological 
progress and increasing returns to scale, which are much more prevalent in European 
East-West trade than in North-South trade. Trade within Europe is intra-industry trade 
reasonably well described by the theoretical model introduced by Markusen, while North-
South trade is more related to standard comparative advantages.  
4  skilled/unskilled migration stocks and aid: complement or 
substitute?  
                                                                                
We continue our analysis by addressing the question of the impact of aid on migration 
with respect to the level of education of migrants. The model upon which our gravity 
equation is based on Borjas (1989, 1994). This model assumes that the decision to 
migrate depends upon education and dispersion of earnings in both the source and   31
destination countries. As a consequence, educated persons migrate to the country 
where return to education is the highest (1); and migrants can be less educated and 
earn less in both home and source countries (negative selection) if the host country 
taxes high income workers relatively more than the source country in order to provide 
better insurance for low income workers against poor labour market outcomes (2).   
 
In compressing the earning distribution, redistribution can be expected to produce a 
migration pattern consisting of negatively selected individuals with below average skill 
levels; conversely, positive selected individuals with above average skilled levels will 
prefer destinations where the earning is higher (and the wealth is not as readily 
redistributed).  
 
This idea is tested with two variables: the replacement rates (over 60 months of 
unemployment) and the Gini index in the destination countries. We expect, therefore, 
that unskilled migrants will prefer destinations with high replacement rates and select 
destinations with low Gini index
6. The replacement rates are a proxy for redistribution 
policies: the higher they are, the more compressed the earnings distribution is likely to 
be.  
 
Tables 9-10-11 report the result for primary, secondary, and tertiary education migrants. 
Such results are based on stocks of migrants, available for one year only, due to data 
limitations. Nevertheless they have a lot of similarities with our previous results based on 
migration flows.  
 
Distance has the same impact on the migration of all types of workers, while language is 
more of an impediment to migrating decision of unskilled people than of skilled people. 
Interestingly, coming from a former colony is not significant for unskilled migrants, and 
coming from a former British, French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies seem to be 
more significant for unskilled workers. Moreover, skilled migrants seem to be more 
attracted to the western offshoots. We do not find any evidence that migrants are 
primarily attracted by access to welfare payments or better public services, nor do we 
find any evidence of a negative (positive) self-selection of unskilled (skilled) migrants 
                                                 
6 Hatton and Williamson (2002) use also the Gini coefficient as a proxy for the return to skills.   32
more attracted towards high (low) redistributive countries. Our findings corroborate the 
empirical literature on this specific issue (see Kahanec, Zimmermann, 2009, page 11-12-
13).  
 
Table 9 : Migration equation, primary level, stocks 
 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Z-Stat   
Diff 0,786***  0,082  9,590  0,000 
lgdppc_s 2,070***  0,314  6,590  0,000 
lgdppc_s2 -0,077***  0,020  -3,860  0,000 
tradeinten~n 2,376*** 0,523  4,540  0,000 
ldist -1,075***  0,063  -16,960  0,000 
colonizer1s 0,002  0,007  0,310  0,758 
colbritish 3,801***  0,325  11,680  0,000 
colfrance 4,653***  0,476  9,780  0,000 
colportugal 5,425***  0,992  5,470  0,000 
colspain 3,505***  0,578  6,070  0,000 
comlang 0,336***  0,115  2,930  0,003 
offchoot 2,649***  0,137  19,400  0,000 
Trn1 -0,020***  0,003  -7,810  0,000 
Intercept 0,626  1,470  0,430  0,670 
R-squared : 0,2868 
Number of obs : 2634  
Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
 
                                                                                
Table 10 : Migration equation, secondary level, stocks 
                                                                                
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Z-Stat   
Diff 1,225***  0,074  16,470  0,000 
lgdppc_s 2,274***  0,287  7,930  0,000 
lgdppc_s2 -0,060***  0,018  -3,300  0,001 
tradeinten~n 1,771*** 0,479  3,700  0,000 
Ldist -1,086***  0,058  -18,650  0,000 
colonizer1s 0,010*  0,006  1,540  0,124 
Colbritish 3,567***  0,298  11,970  0,000 
colfrance 2,877***  0,436  6,600  0,000 
colportugal 4,443***  0,909  4,890  0,000 
Colspain 4,312***  0,529  8,150  0,000 
comlang 0,129  0,105  1,230  0,218 
offchoot 2,799***  0,124  22,600  0,000 
trn1 -0,018***  0,002  -7,590  0,000 
intercept -2,619**  1,339  -1,960  0,051 
R-squared : 0.3360 
Number of obs : 2661 
Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
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Table 11 : Migration equation, tertiary level, stocks 
 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Z-Stat   
Diff 1,037***  0,072  14,460  0,000 
lgdppc_s 1,831***  0,282  6,500  0,000 
lgdppc_s2 -0,041**  0,018  -2,320  0,021 
tradeinten~n 1,907*** 0,473  4,030  0,000 
Ldist -1,006***  0,058  -17,470  0,000 
colonizer1s 0,016***  0,006  2,530  0,011 
colbritish 3,676***  0,296  12,430  0,000 
colfrance 3,905***  0,432  9,030  0,000 
colportugal 4,280***  0,987  4,330  0,000 
Colspain 3,406***  0,525  6,490  0,000 
comlang 0,187**  0,104  1,800  0,072 
Offchoot 3,627***  0,120  30,230  0,000 
trn1 -0,024***  0,002  -10,120  0,000 
intercept -0,604  1,314  -0,460  0,646 
R-squared : 0.3868 
Number of obs : 2705 
Note: ***(resp. **, *) significant at 1 percent (resp. 5 percent, 10 percent). Student-t between brackets.
 
Following the approach of the previous section, we can compute the threshold for 
each level of education under which migration and revenue are complementary, and 
above which they become substitute. We find a hump-shape curve whatever the 
migration variable that we consider: stocks of skilled or unskilled migrants, or flows of 
migrants.  
This similarity of results obtained with either flows or stocks deserve a particular 
comment. According to Lucas (2004), the hump-shaped pattern is suspected to be a 
statistical artefact, due to the use of OECD data, which are stocks. Indeed OECD 
data are likely to overestimate migrations to industrialized countries because they fail 
to take into account migration flows occurring across poor (African notably) countries. 
On the contrary, Lucas said, migration flows do not reveal any inversed U pattern, 
because they are not characterised by the same bias.  
Having at our disposal both sources of data, we can check that they are consistent. 
They do deliver not only the same inversed U pattern between migration and 
revenue, but also more or less, on average, the same threshold. Tables 10-12 
indicate indeed that migration and revenue are complementary up to US$ 4384 for 
primary education, US$ 6367 for secondary education, and US$15085 for tertiary 
education, which on average are not far from the figures we obtained in the previous 
section using flows data.    34
Secondly it is important to notice that there is a range of revenues, over which skilled 
migrants may continue to enjoy better opportunities abroad, while unskilled 
individuals will have better to stay home, given the expected salary they can get on 
the local labour market. For any revenue in this range, an increase in GDP per capita 
will accentuate the brain drain phenomena by favouring the departures of skilled 
workers but not the departures of unskilled workers. This will happen for all East 
European countries and the potential or candidate countries, in as much as their 
GDP per capita exceeds in most cases US$ 4384 but is lower than US$ 15085
7.  
5 Conclusion  
We have shown that foreign assistance and migration are substitute above a 
threshold of about 6084 $US for the entire sample; for within European migration the 
threshold falls to 2837 $US. This contrasting result echoes the specificities of the 
model of European integration process, which has emerged after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, a model which embraces many dimensions: a trade and financial dimension - 
enforced by the European Agreements - a strong institutional and aid dimension - the 
implementation of the Acquis Communautaire - the adhesion to the EU at an 
unprecedented speed, and finally an aid dimension - huge financial transfers 
embodied in the successive Phare programmes and then Structural funds.  
As a result the level under which migration and economic progress are substitute 
turns out to be much lower within Europe. Any improvement in the economic situation 
translate therefore into less migration pressures, and this outcome can be highly 
priced for many reasons, the most important being that governments have to take 
into account the unpopularity of too sudden migration pressures as well as the fear 
(justified or not) of being invaded by workers from abroad (Shiff (2006)).  According to 
our findings, most East-European countries, which entered the EU already, do not 
face and did not create migration pressures induced by their economic progress. 
Hence, if the situation was and is still a win-win situation: as long as income 
                                                 
7 Those results corroborate the finding of Gudrun Biffl (2001, page 159) that EU citizens working in 
another EU country are increasingly highly skilled. The mobility of people with “high and specialized 
skills, in particular in the information-communication technology field, has increased. This does not 
mean, however, that unskilled labour migration has come to a halt in Western Europe. It is still the 
major group of migrants in Western Europe. The source countries of un- and semi-skilled migrants 
changed, however, as the supply of these skills dried up in less developed regions of the EU as a 
result of human resource and economic development.”    35
progressed in Eastern neighbours, this reduced the risk of emigration from these 
countries. By contrast, Bulgaria and Romania, which entered the EU only in 2007, all 
countries classified as potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia), and, amongst candidate countries, 
Macedonia, would face higher emigration outflows in case of an increase in their 
GDP per capita. Hence, for this second group of countries, opening EU frontiers 
would lead to more migration pressures at least for a while and could create policy 
reversals and inconsistencies of EU transfers and labour market liberalization 
policies.  
Our last investigation analyses the tradeoffs faced by skilled and unskilled individuals 
when they consider the option of migrating. A well-known stylised fact is that skilled 
individuals are more mobile than unskilled ones. First we provide a rationale for this 
higher mobility, which is that skilled individuals face lower costs, from the liquidity 
constraint to the linguistic and psychological components of the overall migration 
cost, and they anticipate higher benefits. Second we turn to the migration hump 
framework, and we compute three different thresholds, US$ 4384 for primary 
education, US$ 6367 for secondary education, and US$15085 for tertiary education. 
We emphasise that for any revenue higher than US$ 4384 but lower than US$ 
15085, an increase in GDP per capita accelerates the brain drain phenomena by 
favouring the departures of skilled workers but not the departures of unskilled 
workers. This negative outcome is expected to happen for most East European 
countries and potential or candidate countries. 
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Appendix 1: Data source and Definition 
Variable name  Data Type  Source  Definition 
  
           
GDP per capita -North 
  
Constant prices 2000 
US$ 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank  GDP Per capita of migrants home country 
GDP per capita -South 
  
Constant prices 2000 
US$ 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank  GDP Per capita of migrants host country 
Population  - North 
   Unit 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank  Population of migrants home country 
Population  - South 
   Unit 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank  Population of migrants host country 
  
           
Gini Index OCDE 
   %  OECD Social Indicators (2005) 
Gini Coefficient in mid 1990s (1995) and the 
Gini coefficient in 2000 
Gini Index WB 
   % 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
Calculations from WBG on distribution of 
household income (Peiode 1995 -2005) 
Language: langoff_i - North     CEPII database 
Official or national languages and languages 
spoken by at least 20% of the population of 
the home country 
Language: langoff_i - South     CEPII database 
Official or national languages and languages 
spoken by at least 20% of the population of 
the host country 
Colonizer i (North and South)     CEPII database 
Colonizers of the country for a relatively long 
period of time and with a substantital 
participation in the governance of the 
colonized country 
Replacement Rates With Social Assistence   %  OECD Social Indicators  
Average net remplacements rates over 60 
months of unemployment, periode 2001-
2005  
Replacement Rates Without Social Assistence  %  OECD Social Indicators 
Average net remplacements rates over 60 
months of unemployment, periode 2001-
2005    37 
Remplacement Rates (Average)   %  OECD Social Indicators  
The average of the gross unemployment 
benefit replacement rates for two earning 
levels, three family situations and three 
durations of unemployment. (1995, 1997, 
1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005) 
Migration Policy     Index between 0 and 10 Center for Global Development 
Migration component of Commitment to 
Development Index (period 2003 to 2005)  
   Aid       
Foreign aid mind when people in rich 
countries think of helping poorer countries.  
(period 2003 to 2005)  
   Trade       
The trade component of the CDI penalizes 
countries for erecting barriers to imports of 
crops, clothing, and other goods from poor 
nations  (period 2003 to 2005)  
   Migration       
The migration compares rich countries on 
how easy they make it for people from poor 
ones to immigrate, find work or get 
education, send home money  (period 2003 
to 2005)  
              
 
 
Variable name  Data Type  Source  Definition 
  
           
Aid Bilateral 
  
Constant prices 2006 
US$  DAC database, OECD  Aid Flows from all bilateral donors period 1995 - 2005 
Aid Total 
(Odatotaldisbursements) 
Constant prices 2006 
US$  DAC database, OECD 
The sum of grants, capital subscriptions and net loans from all donors to 
the recipient country 
Migrations Flows 
   Unit 
Database on Immigrants in 
OECD Countries (DIOC)  Inflows of foreig population by nationality 
Migration Stock WB: 
   Unit 
Development Research 
Centre on Migration World 
Bank  Stock of migrants (year 2000) 
  
Primary educat. level  Unit     ISCED 0/1/2 * 
   Unit     ISCED 3/4 *   38 
Secondary educat. level 
  
Tertiary education level  Unit     ISCED 5/6 * 
  
Education no answer  Unit     The unknow Education category 
  
Migration Stock Total  Unit     Group agregated 
Migration Stock OECD  Unit 
Database on Immigrants in 
OECD Countries (DIOC) 
Stock of foreign population by nationality period 1995-2005 (no 
classification of the education) 
  
           
Trade Intensity Aid 
  
Values of Exports and 
GDP are expressed in 
current USD 
OECD's International Trade 
Statistics Databases 
Export bilateral from the donor to the recipient, as a ratio of GDP of the 
donor. ** 
  
           
Trade Intensity Migration 
Values of Imports and 
GDP are expressed in 
current USD 
OECD's International Trade 
Statistics Databases 
Import bilateral from the donor to the recipient, as a ratio of GDP of the 
recipient. ** 
  
           
Distance 
      CEPII database 
Bilateral distance between two countries based on bilateral distances of 
the most important cities/agglomerations (population) 
Distw 
      CEPII database 
Distwces 
      CEPII database 
Inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall 
country's population. *** 
  
           
  
           
*  The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED; cf. UNESCO 1997)    
**  For exports, the trading partner is the country of destination (final) of the goods.    
     For imports, the trading partner is the country of origin or production or consignment.    
***  See Notes on CEPII' s distances measures: Thierry Mayer and Soledad Zignago       39 
Cod   Name Country Cod   Name Country  Cod  Name Country  Cod  Name Country 
1  France  100  Afghanistan  161 Georgia  222 Palau 
2  Belgium  101  Albania  162 Ghana  223 Palestinian Administrations Areas 
3  Canada  102  Algeria  163 Grenada  224 Panama 
4  Denmark  103  Andorra  164 Guam  225 Papua New Guinea 
5  Germany  104  Angola  165 Guatemala  226 Paraguay 
6  Greece  105  Antigua and Barbuda  166 Guinea  227 Peru 
7  Hungary  106  Argentina  167 Guinea-Bissau  228 Philippines 
8  Italy  107  Armenia  168 Guyana  230 Qatar 
9  Luxembourg  108  Azerbaijan  169 Haiti  231 Romania 
10  Netherlands  109  Bahamas  170 Honduras  232 Russian Federation 
11  Poland  110  Bahrain  171 Hong Kong (China)  233 Rwanda 
12  Portugal  112  Bangladesh  173 India  234 Saint Lucia 
13  Slovak Republic 113  Barbados  174 Indonesia  235 Saint Vincent and The Granadines
14  Spain  114  Belarus  175 Iran  236 Samoa 
15  Sweden  115  Belize  176 Iraq  237 Saint Kitts and Nevis 
16  Switzerland  116  Benin  177 Israel  238 Sao Tome and Principe 
17  United Kingdom 117  Bermuda  178 Jamaica  239 San Marino 
18  United States  118  Bhutan  179 Jordan  240 Saudi Arabia 
19  Korea  119  Bolivia  180 Kazakhstan  241 Senegal 
20  New Zealand  120  Bosnia and Herzegobina  181 Kenya  242 Serbia and Montenegro 
21  Norway  121  Botzwana  182 Kiribati  243 Seychelles 
22  Australia  122  Brazil  183 Kuwait  244 Sierra Leone 
23  Austria  123  Brunei Darussalan  184 Kyrgizstan  245 Singapore 
24  Czech Republic 124  Bulgaria  185 Laos  246 Slovenia 
25  Finland  125  Burkina faso  186 Latvia  247 Salomon Islands 
26  Turkey  126  Burundi  187 Lebanon  248 Somalia 
27  Ireland  127  Cambodia  188 Lesotho  249 South Africa 
28  Japan  128  Cameron  189 Liberia  250 Sri Lanka 
172  Iceland  129  Cape Verde  190 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 251 Sudan 
205  Mexico  130  Central African Republic  191 Liechtenstein  252 Suriname 
      131  Chad  192 Lithuania  253 Swaziland 
      132  Chile  194 Macao  254 Syria 
      133  China  195 Macedonia  255 Chinese Taipei 
      134  Colombia  196 Madagascar  256 Tajikistan   40 
      135  Comoros  197 Malawi  257 Tanzania 
      136  Congo  198 Malaysia  258 Thailand 
      137  Cook Islands  199 Maldives  259 Timor -L'este 
      138  Costa Rica  200 Mali  260 Togo 
      139  Cote d'ivoire  201 Malta  261 Tokelau 
      140  Croatia  202 Marshall Islands  262 Tonga 
      141  Cuba  203 Mauritania  263 Trinidad and Tobago 
      142  Cyprus  204 Mauritius  264 Tunisia 
      143  Democratic People's Republic of Korea 206 Micronesia  265 Turkmenistan 
      144  Democratic Republic of the Congo  207 Moldova  266 Tuvalu 
      145  Djibouti  209 Mongolia  267 Uganda 
      146  Dominica  210 Morocco  268 Ukraine 
      147  Dominican Republic  211 Mozambique  269 United Arab Emirates 
      148  Ecuador  212 Myanmar  270 Uruguay 
      149  Egypte  213 Namibia  271 Uzbekistan 
      150  El Salvador  214 Nauru  272 Vanuatu 
      151  Equatorial Guinea  215 Nepal  273 Venezuela 
      152  Eritrea  216 Nicaragua  274 Viet Nam 
      153  Estonia  217 Niger  275 Yemen 
      154  Ethiopia  218 Nigueria  276 Zambia 
      155  Fiji  219 Niue  277 Zimbabwe 
      159  Gabon  220 Oman       
      160  Gambia  221 Pakistan       
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Appendix 2: Trade and FDI (net inflows) 
     Table 1a: Trade (% of GDP), WDI 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hungary 89  96 109 125 131 148 143 128  125 130 134 89 96
  Poland  44 46 51 57 54 61 58 61 69 77 75 44 46
 Slovak Republic  113  116 121 129 126 143 153 149  155 153 160 113 116
  Slovenia  103 103 106 106 101 113 113 111 110 119 127 103 103
  Czech  Republic  106 104 109 110 112 130 133 123 126 140 141 106 104
  Lithuania  109 112 115 102 88 96 105 111 108 111 123 109 112
  Estonia  145 137 158 160 149 174 163 150 146 156 164 145 137
 Latvia  88  101 102 107 90 90 93 91  97 104 110 88 101










  Cyprus  92  95 95 90 88 ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,  92 95














  Romania  61 65 65 53 61 71 74 77 77 81 76 61 65
  Turkey  ,, ,, ,,  42 39 43 51 49  47 50 47 ,, ,, 





















 Croatia  88  90 98 89 90 99 103 102  105 104 103 88 90
  Albania  47 48 47 45 49 57 59 67 66 65 69 47 48
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 92  108 95 119 115 107 106 96  98 100 108 92 108































 Serbia  ,,  ,,  41 52 44 62 59 57  62 69 72 ,,  ,, 
 
 Low & middle 
income  48 46 47 48 49 54 52 55 57 62 64 48 46
 
 Lower middle 
income  47 46 47 48 49 53 52 55 57 62 64 47 46
 
 Russian 
Federation  55 48 47 56 69 68 61 60 59 57 57 55 48
    Moldova  107 129 129 124 120 125 123 131 141 133 143 107 129
   Ukraine  97  94 84 86 102 120 109 106  113 115 102 97 94
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     Table 1b: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), WDI 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hungary 10,76  7,28 9,09 7,11 6,88 5,78 7,40 4,52 2,58 4,42 6,82 5,40 ,, 
 Poland  2,63  2,87 3,12 3,70 4,33 5,45 3,00 2,08 2,12 5,17 3,41 5,62 ,, 
 Slovak 
Republic 1,20  1,64 0,81 2,51 1,72 9,45 7,50 16,82 6,55 7,21 4,44 7,46 ,, 
 Slovenia  0,73  0,84 1,67 1,01 0,49 0,69 2,50 7,31 1,05 2,50 1,54 1,70 ,, 
 Czech 
Republic  4,65 2,31 2,25 5,98 10,49 8,79 9,12 11,29 2,21 4,54 9,30 4,21 ,, 
 Lithuania  0,95  1,86 3,55 8,28 4,46 3,32 3,67 5,04 0,97 3,43 4,01 6,09 ,, 
 Estonia  4,65  3,23 5,39 10,46 5,48 6,89 8,76 3,89 9,36 8,16 21,51 9,63 ,, 
 Latvia  3,43  6,83 8,50 5,39 4,77 5,27 1,59 2,72 2,71 4,63 4,55 8,34 ,, 
 Malta  3,98  8,80 2,46 8,07 23,52 15,44 6,24
-










 Cyprus  2,63  2,50 6,14 3,61 8,31 9,18 9,76 10,45 6,82 7,07 6,84 8,32 ,, 














 Romania  1,18  0,74 3,44 4,82 2,92 2,80 2,88 2,50 3,10 8,53 6,56 9,37 ,, 
 Turkey  0,36  0,29 0,30 0,35 0,31 0,37 1,71 0,49 0,58 0,73 2,03 3,79 ,, 
 Macedonia, 





















 Croatia  0,61  2,57 2,65 4,31 7,33 5,88 6,77 4,90 6,94 3,03 4,60 7,87 ,, 
 Albania  2,89  2,99 2,16 1,65 1,20 3,88 5,07 3,03 3,15 4,57 3,13 3,58 ,, 
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0,00  -0,07 0,03 1,53 3,57 2,74 2,10 4,05  4,56 6,67 4,84 3,45 ,, 































 Serbia  ,,  ,,  3,76 0,70 1,01 0,28 1,40 0,87  6,69 3,94 5,65 16,13 ,, 
 
 Low & middle 
income 1,94  2,22 2,78 2,93 3,18 2,72 2,78 2,49 2,24 2,63 2,83 3,09 ,, 
 
 Lower middle 
income  1,94 2,23 2,81 2,98 3,25 2,78 2,84 2,52 2,26 2,66 2,87 3,09 ,, 
 
 Russian 
Federation 0,52  0,66 1,20 1,02 1,69 1,05 0,90 1,00 1,84 2,61 1,69 3,11 ,, 
   Moldova  1,48  1,40 4,08 4,61 3,24 9,90 3,68 5,06 3,72 3,37 6,61 7,10 ,, 
   Ukraine  0,55  1,17 1,24 1,77 1,57 1,90 2,08 1,63 2,84 2,64 9,06 5,20 ,,   43
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